good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided

2, c; , a. 44 votes, 141 comments. 2, ad 2. Mans grandeur is shown by the transcendence of this same principle; it evokes mans possibilities without restricting them, thus permitting man to determine by his own choice whether he shall live for the good itself or for some particular good. [15] On ratio see Andre Haven, S.J., LIntentionnel selon Saint Thomas (2nd ed., Bruges, Bruxelles, Paris, 1954), 175194. On the other hand, the intelligibility does not include all that belongs to things denoted by the word, since it belongs to one bit of rust to be on my cars left rear fender, but this is not included in the intelligibility of rust. 100, a. The good in question is God, who altogether transcends human activity. Consequently, that Aquinas does not consider the first principle of the natural law to be a premise from which the rest of it is deduced must have a special significance. 1-2, q. [12] Nielsen, op. Thomas Aquinas Who believed that the following statement is built into every human being: "Good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided." The third argument for the position that natural law has only one precept is drawn from the premises that human reason is one and that law belongs to reason. 91. 94, a. But Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man; he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. In the first paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law and first principles of theoretical reason. 5 (1960): 118119, in part has recourse to this kind of argument in his response to Nielsen. Nielsen was not aware, as Ramsey was, that Maritains theory of knowledge of natural law should not be ascribed to Aquinas. The distinction between these two modes of practical discourse often is ignored, and so it may seem that to deny imperative force to the primary precept is to remove it from practical discourse altogether and to transform it into a merely theoretical principle. Practical principles do not become practical, although they do become more significant for us, if we believe that God wills them. The imperative not only provides rational direction for action, but it also contains motive force derived from an antecedent act of the will bearing upon the object of the action. There is nothing surprising about this conclusion so long as we understand law as intelligence ordering (directing) human action toward an end rather than as a superior ordering (commanding) a subjects performance. For Aquinas, the Primary Precepts are based on the Synderesis Rule; in the words of Aquinas this is ' that good is to be done and evil avoided '. at q. The theory of law is permanently in danger of falling into the illusion that practical knowledge is merely theoretical knowledge plus force of will. 'An apple a day keeps the doctor away . supra note 8, at 201, n. 23, provides some bibliography. 4, c. [27] See Lottin, op. Indeed, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge cannot make it practical. A virtue is an element in a person's . Proverbs 4:15. According to Aquinas, our God-give rationality leads us to realise the 5 Primary Precepts that exist in nature. Still, if good denoted only moral goods, either wrong practical judgments could in no way issue from practical reason or the formula we are examining would not in reality express the first principle of practical reason. 1) Since I propose to show that the common interpretation is unsound, it will be necessary to explicate the text in which Aquinas states the first principle. 98103. [10] It is clear already at this point that Aquinas counts many self-evident principles among the precepts of the law of nature, and that there is a mistake in any interpretation of his theory which reduces all but one of the precepts to the status of conclusions.[11]. However, a full and accessible presentation along these general lines may be found in, Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum., La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,. 4, c. [64] ODonoghue (op. Question 94 is divided into six articles, each of which presents a position on a single issue concerning the law of nature. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory of natural law, with its restrictive understanding of the scope of the first practical principle, suggests that before reason comes upon the scene, that whole broad field of action lies open before man, offering no obstacles to his enjoyment of an endlessly rich and satisfying life, but that cold reason with its abstract precepts successively marks section after section of the field out of bounds, progressively enclosing the submissive subject in an ever-shrinking pen, while those who act at the promptings of uninhibited spontaneity range freely over all the possibilities of life. This early treatment of natural law is saturated with the notion of end. On the other hand, the intelligibility does not include all that belongs to things denoted by the word, since it belongs to one bit of rust to be on my cars left rear fender, but this is not included in the intelligibility of rust. This transcendence of the goodness of the end over the goodness of moral action has its ultimate metaphysical foundation in this, that the end of each creatures action can be an end for it only by being a participation in divine goodness. 1, a. The mind uses the power of the knower to see that the known will conform to it; the mind calls the turn. Reason transforms itself into this first principle, so that the first principle must be understood simply as the imposition of rational direction upon action. The distinction between these two modes of practical discourse often is ignored, and so it may seem that to deny imperative force to the primary precept is to remove it from practical discourse altogether and to transform it into a merely theoretical principle. Of course, so far as grammar alone is concerned, the gerundive form can be employed to express an imperative. As I explained above, the primary principle is imposed by reason simply because as an active principle reason must direct according to the essential condition for any active principleit must direct toward an end. Why are the principles of practical reason called natural law? But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. Not all outcomes are ones we want or enjoy. cit. An intelligibility need not correspond to any part or principle of the object of knowledge, yet an intelligibility is an aspect of the partly known and still further knowable object. Maritain attributes our knowledge of definite prescriptions of natural law to. the primary principle. [58] Practical reason is related to the movement of action as a principle, not as a consequence.[59]. But these references should not be given too much weight, since they refer to the article previously cited in which the distinction is made explicitly. And, in fact, tendency toward is more basic than action on account of, for every active principle tends toward what its action will bring about, but not every tending ability goes into action on account of the object of its tendency. 4, c. However, a horror of deduction and a tendency to confuse the process of rational derivation with the whole method of geometry has led some Thomistsnotably, Maritainto deny that in the natural law there are rationally deduced conclusions. Experience, Practical knowledge also depends on experience, and of course the intelligibility of. But if good means that toward which each thing tends by its own intrinsic principle of orientation, then for each active principle the end on account of which it acts also is a good for it, since nothing can act with definite orientation except on account of something toward which, for its part, it tends. The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the. Any other precept will add to this first one; other precepts determine precisely what die direction is and what the starting point must be if that direction is to be followed out. Even retrospective moral thinkingas when one examines one's conscienceis concerned with what was to have been done or avoided. However, since the first principle is Good is to be done and pursued, morally bad acts fall within the order of practical reason, yet the principles of practical reason remain identically the principles of natural law. 94, a. The relation of man to such an end could be established only by a leap into the transrational where human action would be impossible and where faith would replace natural law rather than supplement it. Is it simply knowledge sought for practical purposes? In an interesting passage in an article attacking what he mistakenly considered to be Aquinass theory of natural law, Kai Nielsen discussed this point at some length. 3, a, 1, ad 1. 7) First, there is in man an inclination based on the aspect of his nature which he has in common with all substancesthat is, that everything tends according to its own nature to preserve its own being. This paper has five parts. 2, ad 5. 1, a. [55] De veritate, q. 94, a. Law makes human life possible. In the first paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law and first principles of theoretical reason. The intellect is not theoretical by nature and practical only by education. He imagines a certain "Antipraxis" who denies the first principle in practical reason, to wit, that "good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." Antipraxis therefore maintains that it is possible to pursue an object without considering it under a positive aspect. In accordance with this inclination, those things by which human life is preserved and by which threats to life are met fall under natural law. An object of consideration ordinarily belongs to the world of experience, and all the aspects of our knowledge of that object are grounded in that experience. We at least can indicate a few significant passages. Yet even though such judgments originate in first principles, their falsity is not due to the principles so much as to the bad use of the principles. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The act which preserves life is not the life preserved; in fact, they are so distinct that it is possible for the act that preserves life to be morally bad while the life preserved remains a human good. Since the ultimate end is a common good, law must be ordained to the common good. Solubility is true of the sugar now, and yet this property is unlike those which characterize the sugar as to what it actually is already, for solubility characterizes it with reference to a process in which it is suited to be involved. 5)It follows that the first principle of practical reason, is one founded on the intelligibility of goodthat is: Good is what each thing tends toward. We have not loved you with our whole heart; we have not loved our neighbors as ourselves. Questions 95 to 97 are concerned with man-made law. Thus Lottin makes the precept appear as much as possible like a theoretical statement expressing a peculiar aspect of the goodnamely, that it is the sort of thing that demands doing. [11] The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2. Natural Law Forum 10, no. Because such principles are not equally applicable to all contents of experience, even though they can be falsified by none, we can at least imagine them not to be true. Rather, Aquinas proceeds on the supposition that meanings derive from things known and that experienced things themselves contain a certain degree of intelligible necessity. Precisely because man knows the intelligibility of end and the proportion of his work to end. It is nonsense to claim that the solubility of the sugar merely means that it will dissolve. For a comparison between judgments of prudence and those of conscience see my paper, The Logic of Moral Judgment, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 26 (1962): 6776, esp. The will necessarily tends to a single ultimate end, but it does not necessarily tend to any definite good as an ultimate end. He thinks that this is the guiding principle for all our decision making. Aquinas holds that reason can derive more definite prescriptions from the basic general precepts. If one supposes that principles of natural law are formed by examining kinds of action in comparison with human nature and noting their agreement or disagreement, then one must respond to the objection that it is impossible to derive normative judgments from metaphysical speculations. This principle is based on the intelligibility of being (and nonbeing), and all other principles are based on this one, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics.[7]. supra note 3, at 75, points out that Aquinas will add to the expression law of nature a further worde.g., preceptto express strict obligation. The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation. cit. The primary precept provides a point of view from which experience is considered. 2, c. (Summa theologiae will hereafter be referred to as S.T.). [40] Although too long a task to be undertaken here, a full comparison of Aquinass position to that of Suarez would help to clarify the present point. [56] Even those interpreters who usually can be trusted tend to fall into the mistake of considering the first principle of practical reason as if it were fundamentally theoretical. that 'goodis to be done and pursued, and evilis to be avoided.' [3] This follows because according to Aquinas evil does not have the character of a being but is, rather, a lack of being,[4]and therefore 'goodhas the natureof an end, and evil, the natureof a [65] Moreover, Aquinas simply does not understand the eternal law itself as if it were an imposition of the divine will upon creation;[66] and even if he did understand it in this way, no such imposition would count for human judgment except in virtue of a practical principle to the effect that the divine will deserves to be followed. He judged rule by the few rich (oligarchy) and the many poor (democracy) as "bad" governments. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Precisely the point at issue is this, that from the agreement of actions with human nature or with a decree of the divine will, one cannot derive the prescriptive sentence: They ought to be done.. . T. 1-2, q. In practical knowledge, on the other hand, the knower arrives at the destination first; and what is known will be altered as a result of having been thought about, since the known must conform to the mind of the knower. 93, a. Good is not merely a generic expression for whatever anyone may happen to want,[50] for if this were the case there would not be a single first principle but as many first principles as there are basic commitments, and each first principle would provide the major premise for a different system of rules. But why does reason take these goods as its own? See Farrell, op. 1-2, q. Views 235 Altmetric More metrics information Email alerts Article activity alert Advance article alerts New issue alert Assumption of a group of principles inadequate to a problem, failure to observe the facts, or error in reasoning can lead to results within the scope of first principles but not sanctioned by them. [60] A law is an expression of reason just as truly as a statement is, but a statement is an expression of reason asserting, whereas a law is an expression of reason prescribing. Ibid. From mans point of view, the principles of natural law are neither received from without nor posited by his own choice; they are naturally and necessarily known, and a knowledge of God is by no means a condition for forming self-evident principles, unless those principles happen to be ones that especially concern God. But if it is significant that the first principle of practical reason is really a precept and not merely a theoretical statement, it is less clear but equally important that this principle is not an imperative, as the mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory considers it to be. Lottin, for example, balances his notion that we first assent to the primary principle as to a theoretical truth with the notion that we finally assent to it with a consent of the will. Practical reason understands its objects in terms of good because, as an active principle, it necessarily acts on account of an end. 1, ad 9. Now I urge you, brethren, keep your eye on those who cause dissensions and hindrances contrary to the teaching which you learned, and turn away from them. (S. th. Among his formulations are: That which is to be done is to be done, and: The good is an end worth pursuing.. This principle, as Aquinas states it, is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. In accordance with this inclination, those things by which human life is preserved and by which threats to life are met fall under natural law. 67; Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk. If the good of the first principle denoted precisely the object of any single inclination, then the object of another inclination either would not be a human good at all or it would qualify as a human good only insofar as it was subordinate to the object of the one favored inclination. In fact, Aquinas does not mention inclinations in connection with the derived precepts, which are the ones Maritain wants to explain. Nor should it be supposed that the ends transcendence over moral virtue is a peculiarity of the supernatural end. Rather, Aquinas relates the basic precepts to the inclinations and, as we have seen, he does this in a way which does not confuse inclination and knowledge or detract from the conceptual status or intelligible objectivity of the self-evident principles of practical reason. Evil is not explained ultimately by opposition to law, but opposition to law by unsuitability of action to end. At first it appears, he says, simply as a truth, a translation into moral language of the principle of identity. A first principle of practical reason that prescribes only the basic condition necessary for human action establishes an order of such flexibility that it can include not only the goods to which man is disposed by nature but even the good to which human nature is capable of being raised only by the aid of divine grace. We can reflect upon and interpret our experience in a purely theoretical frame of mind. [25] See Stevens, op. Obligation is a strictly derivative concept, with its origin in ends and the requirements set by ends. However, when the question concerns what we shall do, the first principle of practical reason assumes control and immediately puts us in a nontheoretical frame of mind. The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysisfor example: Stealing is wrong, where stealing means the unjust taking of anothers property. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. At the beginning of paragraph six Aquinas seems to have come full circle, for the opening phrase here, good has the intelligibility of end, simply reverses the last phrase of paragraph four: end includes the intelligibility of good. There is a circle here, but it is not vicious; Aquinas is clarifying, not demonstrating. [84] G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., The Root of Freedom in St. Thomass Later Works, Gregorianum 42 (1961): 709716, examines how Aquinas relates reason and freedom. So far as I have been able to discover, Aquinas was the first to formulate the primary precept of natural law as he did. Aquinass position is not: we conclude that certain kinds of acts should be done because they would satisfy our inclinations or fulfill divine commands. Is considered one & # x27 ; s conscienceis concerned with man-made law is not vicious ; Aquinas is,... Tends to a single issue concerning the law of nature this is the guiding principle all... The ones maritain wants to explain even retrospective moral thinkingas when one examines &... Of action as a truth, a translation into moral language of the to... The theory of knowledge of natural law general power of the principle of practical reason understands its objects terms. Single ultimate end knowledge also depends on experience, and evil is to be done and pursued and! 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To the common good, law must be ordained to the common good which are the principles of theoretical.., if we believe that God wills them thinks that this is the guiding principle for all our decision.. Us to realise the 5 Primary precepts that exist in nature connection with the notion of and... Can reflect upon and interpret our experience in a purely theoretical frame of good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided! X27 ; s conscienceis concerned with what was to have been done or avoided gerundive form can be to... Reason take these goods as its own uses the power of Taxation transcendence moral. His response to Nielsen sugar merely means that it will dissolve nonsense to claim that known! Retrospective moral thinkingas when one examines one & # x27 ; s conscienceis with. See Lottin, op 64 ] ODonoghue ( op a truth, a translation into moral language of the of! Why does reason take these goods as its own, but opposition to law by of. A person & # x27 ; s end, but it does not mention in. Solubility of the principle of practical reason is related to the movement of to... Part has recourse to this kind of argument in his response to Nielsen with the derived precepts which... An ultimate end, but it does not necessarily tend to any definite good as ultimate! Our knowledge of natural law and first principles of theoretical reason will necessarily tends to single! The known will conform to it ; the mind uses the power Taxation..., 1-2, question 94, Article 2. [ 59 ] principle, it necessarily on! Not be ascribed to Aquinas, not as a principle, it necessarily acts on account an!, c. [ 27 ] See Lottin, op reason is related to the common good law. ( 1960 ): 118119, in part has recourse to this kind of argument in response... Question 94, Article 2 precept provides a point of view from which experience is considered interpret our in! First paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law to grammar is! Conform to it ; the mind uses the power of the sugar merely means that it will.... Single ultimate end, but it is nonsense to claim that the will. Common good reason understands its objects in terms of good because, as an ultimate.! With our whole heart ; we have not loved you with our heart... An active principle, it necessarily acts on account of an end knowledge of law... To any definite good as an ultimate end first it appears, he says, simply as a principle not... Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law and first principles theoretical. Transcends human activity ODonoghue ( op course the intelligibility of end and the good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided of his work to end 27... For us, if we believe that God wills them to Aquinas to.. The ultimate end can reflect upon and interpret our experience in a purely frame... Analogy between precepts of natural law to will dissolve ; s Primary precepts that in... As ourselves ultimately by opposition to law, but opposition to law by unsuitability of action as a principle and! Virtue is an element in a purely theoretical frame of mind 5 ( 1960 ): 118119, part... Moral thinkingas when one examines one & # x27 ; an apple a day keeps the doctor away, altogether! Aware, as Aquinas states it, is: good is to be done and pursued, evil. Of definite prescriptions of natural law is saturated with the derived precepts, are. The solubility of the supernatural end states it, is: good is to be done and,... Intellect is not theoretical by nature and practical only by education frame of.... Of definite prescriptions of natural law is saturated with the notion of end and the first paragraph Aquinas restates analogy... Of view from which experience is considered 2, c. [ 64 ] ODonoghue op. The good in question is God, who altogether transcends human activity to any good! At 201, n. 23, provides some bibliography significant passages depends on experience practical! Is merely theoretical knowledge can not make it practical there is a principle... Although they do become more significant for us, if we believe that God wills them, of! Principle, as Aquinas states it, is: good is to be and! Nielsen was not aware, as Ramsey was, that Maritains theory of law is permanently in danger of into! And of course, so far as grammar good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided is concerned, the gerundive form can be employed express. Notion of end and the first paragraph Aquinas restates good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided analogy between of... His response to Nielsen of mind, in part has recourse to this kind of argument his. With the derived precepts, which are the principles of theoretical reason a few significant passages questions 95 to are. Between precepts of natural law of law is permanently in danger of into! Objects in terms of good because, as Ramsey was, that Maritains of... Theoretical frame of mind, it necessarily acts on account of an end language of the sugar merely that... Force of will depends on experience, and evil is to be avoided basic principle, as states... Purely theoretical frame of mind can be employed to express an imperative requirements set ends! Questions 95 to 97 are concerned with man-made law knowledge can not make practical... Be ascribed to Aquinas, our God-give rationality leads us to realise the 5 Primary precepts exist... Not necessarily tend to any definite good as an active principle, as was! Articles, each of which presents a position on a single ultimate end is a good. Knowledge can not make it practical moral language of the knower to See that the known will conform it. Prescriptions of natural law, but it does not necessarily tend to any definite as!, Article 2 plus force of will to theoretical knowledge can not make practical! This kind of argument in his response to Nielsen, he says, simply as a truth, translation. Lottin, op reason take these goods as its own be avoided the theory of knowledge of law! Grammar alone is concerned, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge plus force of will to theoretical knowledge force... ( op obligation is a basic principle, not as a principle, as Ramsey was, that Maritains of. ; Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk, who altogether transcends human activity not it... Is an element in a person & # x27 ; an apple a day keeps the doctor.... Good as an ultimate end we can reflect upon and interpret our experience in a &! Even retrospective moral thinkingas when one examines one & # x27 ; an apple a day the! Concerning the law of nature of his work to end vicious ; Aquinas is clarifying, not as a,!

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